The Pinocchio paradox turns on the truth of Pinocchio -whose nose grows if, and only if, what he is saying is not true -saying 'My nose is growing.' 'Is growing' is an empirical predicate, not a semantic one. Furthermore, it is not just a matter of interpretation whether Pinocchio's nose is and is not growing. If it is a true contradiction that Pinocchio's nose grows and does not grow, then such a world is metaphysically impossible, not merely semantically impossible. [3, p. 307] But the truth about Pinocchio's nose is prefixed by the usual operator: according to the story, Pinocchio's nose grows and does not. How this truth (about what's true in the story) is supposed to bleed into the real world -or any of its possible worlds -remains both unclear and without argument from EldridgeSmith. Indeed, whether there is a world described by the Pinocchio story isof course -highly controversial, especially in the context at hand.
That there is no possibility in which non-semantic, metaphysically noteworthy contradictions occur is perfectly compatible with the existence of stories in which Pinocchio-like craziness occurs. Pending (much) further argument, simply-semantic dialetheists may treat the Pinocchio story as just what it is: an enjoyable story without noteworthy metaphysical consequences.
